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Abstract 
Two well established insights of economic analysis are applied to four case studies on civic 
disengagement: the use of incentives implicit in supply-and-demand analysis, and marginal 
analysis.  The case studies comprise social security, housing benefit, hospital consultant 
outpatients and free school meals. 
The case studies support the proposition that incentives can work or are thought to do so, and 
that takeup is higher, the larger the benefit.  But other factors can over-ride, and significant 
proportions do not respond in the predicted way.  In the case of the spare-room subsidy, the 
policy makers’  goals were arguably unrealistic.  In the case of Working Tax Credit and 
Pension Credit, the reasons are far from clear.   
Marginal analysis is used to quantify how much it could cost to increase takeup, when takeup 
of a means tested benefit is already nearly universal, as it had been for Free School Meals 
among Primary School pupils.  The chosen method, universal free provision for P1-P3 
children, would seem disproportionate, unless the main reason for this policy has been to 
impact all children, and not just those who had been means tested.  This case study shows the 
importance of marginal analysis when designing policies to increase civic engagement. 
 
  
3 
 
Introduction 
Some years ago, reflecting on his experience as Economic Adviser to the two UK 
Governments, Alexander Cairncross encapsulated the contribution of economics to be 
supply-and-demand analysis and the marginal principle, recognising the role of incentives as 
an instrument of the market mechanism.  Time has moved on, and so has the discipline.  
What we attempt here is to draw upon some of these early insights to understand what might 
influence civic engagement, and what the costs of doing so might be. 
Four examples are used.  The limited take up of means tested social security benefits has long 
been recognised (HMRC, 2015, table 2).  The first example looks at recent data on the 
benefits to those that take up benefits and the cost to those that do not.  Three of the four 
studied offer non-trivial benefits, but evidence of the limited takeup must make one wonder if 
there are serious issues in their administration.  The second looks at housing benefit - also 
non-trivial – and the potential disincentive effects on takeup of some recent policy 
innovations.  The third topic, attendance at out-patient clinics, also recognises the potential 
incentive effects of provider payment on their introduction of measures to increase uptake.  
The final topic looks at the cost of introducing universal provision, in this case of free school 
meals to the first three primary school classes.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
observations made. 
Welfare Benefits, Means Tests and Takeup1 
Economics 
A starting point for economists concerning takeup is to compare the costs and benefits to 
applicants.  Costs and benefits need not be financial but, if they are, then it is comparatively 
easy to test the hypothesis that takeup is an increasing function of benefits to costs.  Tax 
Credits and Pension Credit provide an opportunity to do this, with the publication of their 
takeup rates by HM Revenue & Customs [HMRC]2 and the Department of Work & Pensions 
[DWP]3, respectively.  Tax Credits and Pension Credit are means tested but not taxable (UK, 
2015a).   
HMRC and DWP use similar procedures to estimate those eligible, and translate this in terms 
of the proportions of caseload and expenditure taken up; some of the details are different, as 
will become apparent.  Administrative data are used to indicate those who took up benefits, 
and survey data to estimate those who were eligible but not claiming.  Both sources give 
estimates of takeup, and identify 95% confidence intervals [CI], of the proportions of 
caseload and expenditure taken up.  In addition, the DWP gives the mean values of those who 
claimed to compare with those who did not.  We point out when the reports indicate 
differences in central estimates are statistically significant. All the data refer to the financial 
year 2013-14 unless otherwise stated.  The two sources are taken in turn.  
                                                          
1 This section has benefitted enormously from the annual Child Poverty Action Group publication CPAG (2014) 
and from comments on an earlier draft by the Department of Work & Pensions. 
2 See HMRC (2014) 
3 See DWP (2015a & 2015b) 
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Tax Credits 
HMRC administers Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit, and they share some common 
features with income tax administration, such as an annual system and the fact that they are 
based on gross (pre-tax) incomes.  They were introduced in April 2003, and over the next five 
years are due to be replaced by Universal Credit (UK, 2015b). The test of means is based on the 
‘family’, not the individual’s income.  Savings are not included in the test of means, except in 
so far as they generate interest payments.  The reference period is the financial year, and is 
used to determine the family’s means and what benefits it might be paid.  As shown below, 
the two tax credits are combined for administrative purposes.  To avoid generating excessive 
numbers of over- or underpayments, entitlement does not change when income increases or 
decreases between financial years by prescribed amounts.   
Working Tax Credit [WTC]: tops up income for people aged 25 and working at least 30 
hours per week; at least 16 hours or more for those aged 60 and over; and at least 16 hours for 
families with children and those with a disability, with couples with children additionally 
required to work 24 hours between them.  ‘Working’ is taken to mean gainful employment, 
and in that sense WTC supports working people with low income.  Households may be in 
receipt of Child Tax Credit as well as WTC.  The maximum amount WTC is based on the 
following elements: the ‘Basic element’ was worth £1920 per annum in 2013-14 - the rates 
are a little higher now - with additional amounts for couples and lone parents at £1970 per 
annum; those working 30 hours a week at £790; and additional amounts for childcare and the 
disabled.  So a couple working at least 30 hours a week and with no disabilities might have 
received as much as £4680 that year.  Families are paid the maximum WTC when family 
income is below the ‘income threshold’.  In the financial year the ‘income threshold’ was 
£6420.  Those with a higher income receive less, with a ‘withdrawal rate’ of 41% for any 
income above the threshold.  Thus if family income were £7000, then the WTC would have 
been £4442.204.   
Child Tax Credit [CTC]: tops up income for low income families with children, whether or 
not the families are in work.  It is available for children up to the age of 16 years, and to 19 
years if in full-time non-advanced education or approved training.  Families may be in receipt 
of Child Benefit as well as CTC.  To put CTC in context, for most families5, Child Benefit 
was worth £20.30 per week for the first child and £13.40 for each subsequent child, 
irrespective of income, and was not taxable.  CTC had a ‘family element’ worth £545 per 
year to which was added £2720 per year for each child, with additional help for disabled 
children.  Again there is an income threshold for CTC.  For families also claiming WTC, the 
threshold it is the same as for WTC only, namely £6420.  For families, only claiming CTC is 
was £15,910 that year.   
As noted above, the two tax credits are combined for administrative purposes.  The £6420 is 
the point at which the taper applies to both WTC and CTC, if the family is in work (WTC is 
                                                          
4 £4442.20 = £4680-(£7000-£6420)*0.41]. 
5 From January 2013 the net financial benefit from Child Benefit fell with income if applicants or their partners 
have had incomes in excess of £50,000 (UK, 2015c). 
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tapered first, then CTC); the £15910 figure is used to taper CTC only for out of work 
families. So the only point at which income is too high to qualify for WTC but low enough to 
qualify for maximum CTC is (for in-work families only) the exact income point at which 
WTC is tapered away to zero and CTC is still paid in full.  Thus the maximum CTC for a 
family with, say, three children, none of whom were disabled would have been £87056.  If the 
family income had been £16,500, then the CTC paid would have been £8463.107.  These are 
large sums and, in addition, families eligible for the maximum CTC are also eligible for Free 
School Meals worth at least £330 per year per child about that time (Scottish Government, 
nd). 
 
Data on the takeup of families with and without children by the amount of tax credit to which 
they are eligible are given in tables 1 and 2, respectively.  Comparing families with children 
against families without children we find, for any given benefit range, that take up was higher 
for those with children.  More significantly for the hypothesis being tested, within these two 
groups, in general, the larger the expected benefit, the higher the takeup rate.  Almost all 
families with children eligible took tax credits worth £4000 and over that year.  But most 
families with no children did not take up the tax credits for which they were eligible, even 
when there were worth at least £2000 that year. 
[Insert table 1] 
[Insert table 2] 
Welfare Benefits 
The DWP administers a variety of benefits.  We concentrate on Pension Credit, as it is both 
clear how large the benefits can be8, and there is a like-for-like basis when comparing those 
who claimed against those who failed to do so9.   
Pension Credit was introduced on 6 October 2003, and has two elements: Guarantee Credit 
and Savings Credit.  Both are subject to a test of means: unlike WTC and CTC, assessment 
has been based on savings as well as income.  Account was taken of savings in excess of 
£10,000.  Guarantee Credit is available for both singles and couples, of whom at least one is 
over the Pension Credit qualifying age.  The Pensions Credit qualifying age is set in line with 
the State Pension age for women, so some men may be eligible even if they are too young for 
the State Pension.  The qualifying age was 61 years and six months (DWP, 2015a, p 13).  The 
Savings Credit is available for those aged 65 year or over.  The two elements are taken in 
turn.   
                                                          
6 £8705 = £545+(3*£2720).   
7 £8463.10 = £8705-(£16,500-£15,910)*0.41.   
8 Housing Benefit is an example when the potential size is the locally determined rent.  See Kemp (2007, p 118) 
for a review of evidence of the hypothesis as applied to Housing Benefit.   
9 Job Seeker’s Allowance is an example where the size for those who claimed includes the contributory as well 
as the Income Based element; whereas the size for those who did not claim is just the Income Based element. 
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The Standard Minimum Guarantee for Guarantee Credit, puts a floor on the income for single 
people or couples who have reached the qualifying age and, if necessary, to top up those with 
no or low incomes.  This floor was set at a weekly rate of £145.40 for single people and 
£222.05 for couples (DWP, 2015a, p 12).  This compares with the largely contributory 
National Insurance Basic State Pension whose maximum value was £110.15 for individual 
pensioners.  The basic State Pension may be supplemented by an additional voluntary State 
Pension such as the State Earnings Related Pension, and occupational and personal pensions.  
A single person who does not qualify for any additional amounts10, with only the maximum 
basic State Pension and savings below £10,000 would have been eligible for a weekly 
Guarantee Credit of £35.2511.   
The estimates of the caseload takeup rates for those eligible were 70% [CI: 66%, 75%] for 
single men, 71% [CI: 68%, 74%] for single women, and 66% [CI: 62%, 70%] for couples; it 
was significantly lower for couples than for single men or for single women (DWP 2015a, 
table 2.3.7 and section 2.3.9).   
Data in table 3 give some idea of how large the weekly benefits were for those who claimed 
and those who did not.  Mean values are given for the two groups by family type and, in the 
case of non-claimants, the median value.  The mean values for non-claimants was lower than 
for claimants: for example, for single men they were £72 and £71, respectively; but the 
difference is not necessarily statistically significant.  Notice also that the median values for 
non-claimants were less than the corresponding means: for example, for single men they were 
£55 and £71, respectively.  This indicates that a preponderance of non-claimants were 
eligible for sums below the corresponding mean values.  Whilst the evidence is suggestive 
that larger benefits encouraged claiming, especially among couples, the evidence is not 
supported by tests of statistical significance.  Given that Guarantee Credit has been a passport 
to several benefits - perhaps most significantly to Housing Benefit12 - it is surprising that the 
takeup rate was barely 70%.   
[Insert table 3] 
Savings Credit is designed to encourage those with low incomes to save.  Unlike other 
benefits considered here, weekly payments are available for those reaching a minimum 
threshold.  The weekly income thresholds were £115.30 and £183.90 for single people and 
couples, respectively.  These thresholds are above the basic State Pension, but below the 
corresponding floors for the Guarantee Credit.  Thus those eligible for Savings Credit could 
also be eligible for Guarantee Credit.  Savings Credit, however, is limited to those aged 65 
and over, and to that extent is not available for all those eligible for the Guarantee Credit.  
The ‘maximum savings credit’ was £18.06 and £22.89 weekly for single people and couples, 
                                                          
10 A Pension Credit recipient may qualify for additional amounts if they are disabled, having caring 
responsibilities, or responsibility for paying certain housing costs. 
 
11 £35.25 = £145.40-£110.15. 
12 Worth on average £90 per week for those who claimed and £50 for those who did not (DWP, 2015a, table 
5.3.2). 
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respectively.  Working out how large it might be is more complicated than for Guarantee 
Credit. 
If the claimant’s income is below the Standard Minimum Guarantee, then the Savings Credit 
would be 60% for any income in excess of its threshold, upto the maximum amount.  Thus a 
single person with a weekly income of £130 would be eligible for not only a Guarantee 
Credit of £15.4013, but also for £8.8214 as Savings Credit.  On the other hand, if the 
applicant’s income is too high to qualify for Guarantee Credit, then a deduction is made, 
based at 40% of the difference between their Appropriate Minimum Guarantee (the standard 
Minimum Guarantee plus any additional amounts the applicant is entitled to) and that 
income.  Thus for a single person with a weekly income of £150, there would have been a 
deduction of £1.8415 from the potential Savings Credit of £18.06.  This means they would 
have been entitled to £16.2216 of Savings Credit.    
The estimates of the caseload takeup rates for those eligible were 51% [CI: 46%, 58%] for 
single men, 47% [CI: 44%, 52%] for single women, and 43% [CI: 39%, 47%] for couples.  
Takeup was significantly lower for couples than for single men or single women (DWP, 
2015a, table 2.3.10 and section 2.3.12).  Takeup was also lower for Savings Credit than for 
Guarantee Credit but, as can be seen from table 3, this is consistent with its very much lower 
benefits. 
Conclusions 
The analysis shows that family characteristics are one among several possible influences on  
takeup (Eurofound, 2015).  Thus families with children had higher takeup rates for Tax 
Credits, and single people had higher takeup rates than couples for Pension Credit.  This 
complicates attempts to test whether takeup is an increasing function of the size of benefits.  
Nevertheless, when there is correction for family type, the evidence points in this direction, 
though no tests of statistical significance were published. 
Housing Benefit and Incentives 
One area of inquiry is why eligible recipients to means-tested benefits do not make full use of 
that eligibility (Gibb, 2016). Issues of stigma, the quality of information dissemination 
regarding benefit entitlement, bureaucratic complexity (e.g. translating changing individual 
economic circumstances into new entitlements), and small financial returns when recipients 
are only entitled to small amount of tapered-off benefits (though in-work receipt of benefits 
has risen markedly in recent years) – all may contribute to lower take-up rates. 
A further important dimension is welfare reform. This is a cumulative strategy or package of 
reforms of means-tested working age benefits, which seek to simplify the system, reduce long 
term spending on such benefits and encourage work incentives. In other words, the latter 
                                                          
13 £15.40 = £145.40-£130. 
14 £8.82 = (£130-£115.30)*0.60. 
15 £1.84 = (£150-£145.40)*0.40. 
16 £16.22 = £18.06-£1.84. 
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objective indicates that there is a belief held by policy makers that redesigning benefit can 
encourage change in behaviour through the application of economic incentives. Below, we 
briefly consider one of these housing-related reforms: the spare-room subsidy (or bedroom 
tax, as it is colloquially known). These reforms may also of course impact on the drivers of 
eligible benefit take-up. 
The context is the rapid rise in the cost of housing benefit (HB) from £11 billion in 2000-01 
to £21 billion in 2010-11 to more than £24 billion in 2014-15 (reported in Gibb, 2016). Much 
of this growth has come in the private rented sector, which has expanded greatly in the last 15 
to 20 years (and where rents are considerably higher). When the Coalition Government was 
elected in 2010 it rapidly moved to a focus to reduce the large public funding deficit it faced 
and within that strategy, HB was considered a priority target. Later, further changes to 
working age benefits associated with the 2012 Welfare Reform Act, proposed further radical 
changes such as the introduction (now underway) of Universal Credit, a single benefit that 
would incorporate half a dozen of the main means-tested benefits and tax credits, including 
HB (though dealing with housing costs is acknowledged to be highly problematic because of 
local variation in the cost of housing).   
We will here focus on one specific aspect of the reforms: Spare-room subsidy (or bedroom 
tax) involved a decision to reduce the housing benefit level available to working age social 
tenants who were deemed to be consuming excessive housing space. If they had an excess of 
one room, their HB would be cut by 14% and if more than one room, their HB would fall by 
25%. The policy was articulated as an attempt to encourage affected households to find 
smaller accommodation (known as downsizing), or move out the social sector altogether or 
get off HB by increasing employment income. Skeptics argued that the lack of alternative 
accommodation meant that the reduction in benefit was a compulsory levy or tax under 
another name. 
The policy objective for the HB reduction for excess housing space consumption of course 
has an important grain of truth to it – that it is important to balance household size with 
accommodation size in order to efficiently utilize the existing housing stock (and to avoid 
situations where over-consumptions of rooms sits along side over-crowding elsewhere) and 
that once a tenancy is created it is not obvious what mechanism will encourage a shrinking 
family to move to better sized accommodation, thereby freeing the space for larger 
households. However, at the same time it is recognised that this is also viewed as an incentive 
structure designed to cut the HB bill by encouraging affected households to either (a) down-
size to a smaller property with a lower rent and therefore a reduced HB liability; (b) to move 
to smaller properties in the private rented sector (though this may or may not reduce the HB 
bill – it depends on the relative rents); (c) take employment or more employment so that the 
household does not rely on HB in the first place, thus saving HB from the DWP’s point of 
view17; or, (d) do nothing and take the hit of the reduced HB support. 
                                                          
17 They might also be able to take in a lodger though this may of itself reduce HB eligibility by affecting the 
household income calculation 
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There are three important caveats. Housing supply has greatly changed over the last few 
decades in the social rented sector. They are simply far fewer smaller units e.g. one bedroom 
properties, as these for many years were widely agreed to be unsuitable and moreover a spare 
room was generally considered to be a reasonable and normal expectation18. Second, it has 
transpired since the launch of the charge in April 2013 that the social rented sector has a 
disproportionate number of disabled or long term sick working age households claiming HB 
who may have additional or specialist space requirements which require an extra room. As 
much as a majority of all those affected may be in this situation. Third, households under-
occupying are generally not found in the social rented sector but in the owner-occupied 
sector. Within social renting, the much larger problem concerns the under-occupation of 
retired households rather than those of working age. 
Gibb (2015) reports Scottish evidence that the numbers potentially affected were lower than 
anticipated in the first year of the policy but that the capacity of the system to allow tenants to 
downsize within social renting was highly restricted and with reasonable assumptions about 
vacancies and relative priorities for re-housing, could easily take 5-10 years to resolve the 
starting volume of under-occupiers receiving HB in Scotland.19 Qualitative evidence also 
suggested that for some downsizing by moving to smaller properties in the rental market and 
receiving Local Housing Allowance (the equivalent of HB for private renters) may end up 
costing the welfare bill more because market rents are so much higher than social rents.  
The DWP has funded independent ex post evaluation research on the spare room subsidy 
CCHPR, 2015). The study found that: - After 9 months, the majority of those who originally faced a cut in HB because of 
under-occupation, still faced the spare room subsidy charge. - Only one in five of those no longer affected said they had entered employment and 
thus come off HB. - Only 0.3% of affected tenants took lodgers. Much more important was cutting back 
elsewhere – on energy, food and travel. There is an inelasticity associated with 
housing or shelter, which means those affected have to reduce their non-housing 
consumption because staying where they are is in practice the priority. - One reason is the lack of alternative accommodation. While downsizing is being 
prioritised across England, there was a widely recognised shortage of smaller 
properties and landlords were also experiencing difficulty letting larger vacant 
properties. 
 
One key conclusion from this brief discussion is that it is not easy to design incentives to 
work with the market or with household behaviour. Perhaps this is in part because the 
objectives of saving money and the ex ante impact assessment work did not have the 
                                                          
18 Starting the spare room subsidy penalty at 2 or more rooms might have been more acceptable? 
19 The Scottish Government decided to fully mitigate the cost of the spare room subsidy by topping up form its 
own resources transitional discretionary housing payments from DWP for help with those facing hardship. 
Interestingly, many English authorities (the scheme is run by councils) consider the LHA cuts to be more 
important and have diverted these funds to the private rented sector. In Scotland all of the funds go to meet 
the cost of the spare room subsidy so that in theory no-one should be financially worse off. 
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supporting evidence available to underpin what was being proposed. A striking contrast is to 
be found between the DWP impact assessment of welfare reform (DWP, 2011 and 2012) and 
those of the critical Scottish government, the latter largely refuting the UK Government’s ex 
ante appraisal of the effects of its welfare reforms, including the spare room subsidy 
(SGCAS, 2011). 
Using Incentives to Improve Attendance at Hospital Clinics 
Payment by Results is a mechanism for reimbursing NHS providers in England.  It started on 
a pilot basis to cover provider costs, including outpatient activity in the financial year 2004-
05, and was extended to all providers in the financial year 2006-07 (DoH, 2012, fig 27).  
Payment is set prospectively and based on the average of historic cost of the activity for all 
providers, with uniform adjustments for annual changes in prices and expected efficiency 
improvements, and uprated by the Market Forces Factor assigned to each provider depending 
on its geographic location.  The scheme has not been adopted in this form in the rest of the 
UK, though similar arrangements may be found in other countries.  
Raftery et al (1996) suggests that, prior to the introduction of Payment by Results, most 
hospitals in England were paid on the basis of ‘sophisticated block’ or ‘cost and volume’ 
contracts.  Adjustments for activity over the planned level were based on marginal cost, 
which could be from 10% to 50% of average cost, with the latter set retrospectively.   
Farrar et al (2009) finds evidence of that in its early days Payment by Results had an 
incentive to make inpatient activity more efficient in terms of reducing length of stay, based 
on three sets of comparisons, one comparing England and Scotland.   
Data  on the effect on provider income of an additional outpatient attendance from switching 
to Payment by Results is given in table 4 for two common specialties.  Payment was larger 
for new than for return outpatients.  If there had been no adjustment in the past when actual 
activity was different from that planned, then the additional income would be set at 100%.  
Raftery et al (1996) has suggested that there had been an adjustment from 10% to 50%.  In 
these cases the additional income would be set at 90% and 50%, respectively.  In the financial 
year 2014-15 the Market Forces Factor could raise payment rates by as much as 30% 
(Monitor and NHS England, 2013b, figure 2).   
Insert table 4 
New outpatient activity largely depends on GP referrals, which in turn could depend, for any 
given provider, on its range and perceived quality of services.  Return/review appointments, 
on the other hand, could be more directly influenced by the provider.  In terms of incentives, 
providers wishing to increase outpatient activity for new outpatients might reasonably focus 
on reducing DNA and patient and hospital cancellation rates.  There would be a similar 
incentive for return outpatient activity, but providers could also recourse by increasing the 
return: new ratio.   
Last minute reminders and ‘patient focussed booking’, also known as ‘partial booking’, are 
two ways DNA rates could be reduced.  Two studies of events in Scotland give orders of 
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magnitude of the cost per DNA avoided, against which the net income providers can expect 
to receive.  One study of paediatric care for a variety of specialties found SMS text 
reminders, when patient focussed booking was in place, cost £7.50 [£10.00 in 2014-15 
prices20] for new outpatients when the DNA rate was 4.7%; but had no impact on return 
outpatients prior to the introduction of patient focussed booking (Milne et al, 2006).  The 
other study found the cost to be £15.13 [£17.48 in 2014-15 prices] per DNA avoided for non-
psychiatric specialties under patient focussed booking whose DNA rate was approximately 
10% (Milne, 2010, table 4).  Both these estimates are well below the expected additional 
income providers might expect under Payment by Results from sending last minute reminder 
to new outpatients. 
Free School Meals [FSMs]: the Cost of Extending to Universal Provision21 
In January 2015 the Scottish Government introduced Free School Meals [FSMs] for all 
primary children in stages P1-P3.  A similar initiative was introduced in England a few 
months before.  Some years earlier a report by an expert committee in Scotland identified a 
number of issues, one of which is the stigma attached to the means tested FSMs programme 
which discouraged takeup (O’Neill, 2003, section 4).  One remedy was the statutory 
requirement that schools introduce an anonymous system by August 2008.  Universal 
provision was identified as another remedy among those who would otherwise have been 
eligible under the means tested arrangements.  A trial was set up in Scotland the school year 
2007-08 for stages P1-P3 at five of the its 32 Local Authorities, selected for the variety of 
their characteristics, for example, the proportion of primary school pupils registered for FSMs 
varied from around 9% in the Scottish Borders to 35% in Glasgow (MacLardie et al, 2008, 
table 3.1). What follows builds upon the evaluation of this trial. 
One of the striking features of the evaluation is the fairly modest increase in uptake -  just 4.4 
percentage points for those registered for FSM in stages P1-P3 taking the five Local 
Authorities together - at the cost in terms of potentially lost revenue from the 68.9 percent of 
those who would otherwise have had to pay (MacLardie et al, 2008, table 3.6).  The increase 
in an uptake of 1.1 percentage points among P4-P7 pupils registered for FSMs might 
arguably also be attributed to the trial.  Looking at proportions can be misleading.  The aim in 
this paper is to calculate the number of registered FSM pupils who benefitted from the Trial 
and compare it with the cost of all those not registered who now had free school meals.  We 
explore this for each of the five Local Authorities. 
There was little change in the primary school population over the period of the evaluation for 
any of the Local Authorities studied.  Because of our interest in P4-P7 as well as P1-P3 
pupils, we use the September 2007 census on school rolls which gives a breakdown by stage 
(Scottish Government, 2008, table 6.4).  Reported uptake in the evaluation is based on those 
present – not on those on the roll - and so some adjustment is required for non-attendance.  
                                                          
20 Adjustment made using the Consumer Price Index. 
 
21 Those wishing to read a more wide ranging evaluation are referred to Beaton et al (2014). 
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We are able to do this for the school meals census in February 2008 and assume it is the same 
before the trial started.  Attendance varies modestly by Local Authority and whether the pupil 
was registered for FSMs, but hardly at all by stage, taking Scotland and the school year as a 
whole (Scottish Government, 2009, table 1.2).  Using these assumptions it is possible to 
estimate the additional number of P1-P3 and P4-P7 registered FSM pupils who benefitted 
from the trail, and the number of P1-P3 non-registered FSM pupils who benefitted from the 
school meals that were now free.  These numbers are given in table 5. 
Insert Table 5 
The cost of the trial has two elements: the loss of revenue from charges for pupils who took 
meals before the trail, and the cost of providing additional meals to those others for whom 
they were now free.  The evaluation gives information on both.  In respect of the cost of 
provision, it refers to the extra cost of the meals and, in the case of equipment, the full cost of 
capital is applied to the first 100 days.  The data given below are a revised set of estimates.  
Equipment costs are put on an annual basis, and then amortised assuming an eight year life 
and 0.035 discount rate per annum as recommended HM Treasury.  The third set of unit costs 
are taken from the annual report on School Meals, comparing annual costs and the number of 
meals, and are not used later in generating the results in table 7.  They are presented purely to 
give some idea of how costs vary for the whole school year.  None of these financial data 
should be understood to indicate the respective efficiency of Local Authorities.  The three 
sets of unit cost data, in 2007-08 prices, are given in table 6. 
Insert Table 6 
The data  given above draw upon two school meal censuses: one day in October 2007 and 
another day in February 2008.  Additional meals imply additional pupils taking school meals 
that day.  Thus in generating the cost of an additional meal, we are actually referring to an 
additional pupil.  This should be born in mind when data in tables 5 and 6 are combined in 
table 7 to give the cost per additional meal among primary pupils who would have been 
registered for FSMs.  The data are given in 2007-08 prices, to correspond to the information 
contained in the evaluation.  The data in 2014 prices are uprated by 10% for the cost of 
preparing the meal (Office of National Statistics, undated), and to reflect current charges by 
Local Authorities. 
Insert table 7   
It is clear that the cost of increasing uptake – for example, £47 for Glasgow in 2007-08 - is 
very much larger than the cost of a standard school meal, whether at the time of the trial - 
£2.29 - or today.  In fact, it is perhaps surprising that universal FSMs could be expect to do 
much to increase uptake among those registered. Already nearly 90% of registered pupils 
present at the school took advantage of the free meal, and this had been the case for a number 
of years before the trial (Scottish Government, 2008, table 2).  The case for universal 
provision for P1-P3 pupils must have some other justification.  One possibility is to 
encourage all pupils to take a school meal, as a way to introducing young children to a 
healthy diet: after all, possibly charges deterred a significant proportion of those not 
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registered.  Another possibility is that means tested FSM provision does not reach the very 
poorest, for whatever reason (Morelli and Seaman, 2010), in particular they may have in 
mind children whose parents failed to register them as eligible.   
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Table 1 Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit caseload takeup rates for families with 
children, by ‘modelled entitlement’, UK, financial year 2013-14 (%) 
Entitlement  Caseload takeup rate 
 Lower bound Central estimate Upper bound 
Under £1000 45 53 64 
£1000-£2000 47 55 65 
£2000-£4000 81 85 89 
£4000 and over 90 93 95 
 
Source: HMRC (2015, table 5). 
Note: lower and upper bounds refer to 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Table 2 Working Tax Credit caseload takeup rates for families without children, by 
‘modelled entitlement’, UK, financial year 2013-14 (%) 
Entitlement  Caseload takeup rate 
 Lower bound Central estimate Upper bound 
Under £1000 23 25 27 
£1000-£2000 29 32 36 
£2000 and over  45 48 52 
 
Source: HMRC (2015, table 12). 
Note: lower and upper bounds refer to 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 3 Pension Credit weekly benefits by Family Type, Claimed or not, and Element, 
Financial Year 2013-14 (£) 
Element Family type Claimed Not claimed 
  Mean 
value 
Mean 
value 
Median 
value 
     
Guarantee Credita Single men 72 71 55 
 Single women 61 54 35 
 Couples 94 83 59 
     
Savings Credit Single men 11 8 8 
 Single women 11 9 9 
 Couples 12 10 9 
 
Source: DWP (2015a, tables 2.3.8 and  2.3.11) 
Note: (a) Includes some elements of Savings Credit are combined with Guarantee Credit.  
See the text to show how this is possible. 
 
Table 4  Effect on provider income of one additional outpatient attendance, select specialties, 
financial year 2014-15 (£) 
Scale of payment Specialty New outpatient Return outpatient 
(% of average cost)  (£) (£) 
100 General surgery 140.00 81.00 
100 General medicine 178.00 101.00 
90 General surgery 126.00 72.90 
90 General medicine 160.20 90.90 
50 General surgery 70.00 40.50 
50 General medicine 89.00 50.50 
 
Notes:  
Data refers to single professional engagements. 
No adjustment for Market Forces Factor. 
Source:  Monitor and NHS England (2013a, Outpatients). 
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Table 5 Effect of Trial on Number of School Meals, by stage and whether registered for FSM 
Local Authority Registered FSMs Not-Registered FSMs 
 Extra from 
Trial 
Extra from 
Trial 
Before Trial Extra from 
Trial 
 P1-P3 P4-P7 P1-P3 P1-P3 
Glasgow 172 36 4514 2011 
Fife 83 84 3577 2834 
West 
Dunbartonshire 
47 23 809 523 
East Ayrshire 47 34 837 874 
Scottish Borders 28 -4 1001 967 
 
Notes: See text. 
 
Table 6 Unit costs and charges, £ per meal, 2007-08 prices 
Local Authority Adjusted evaluation Local Authority Local Authority 
 Marginal Cost Charges Average Cost 
Glasgow 2.29 1.15 2.65 
Fife 1.64 1.55 2.38 
West Dunbartonshire 3.32 1.47 2.33 
East Ayrshire 2.22 1.56 2.27 
Scottish Borders 3.51 1.60 2.64 
 
Source: MacLardie et al (2008, figures 6.2 and 6.7 and table 6.1). 
Notes: See text. 
 
Table 7 Cost of increasing take up by registered FSM primary pupils by one meal (£) 
Local Authority 2007-08 prices 2014 prices 
Glasgow 47 57 
Fife 61 69 
West Dunbartonshire 42 49 
East Ayrshire 40 46 
Scottish Borders 214 246 
 
Sources: Local Authority schools catering organisations. 
Notes: See text 
 
